Prompt: Which two schools of international relations are more alike: Realism and Liberalism, Liberalism and Constructivism, or Constructivism and Realism?

Liberalism & Constructivism

Three people are sitting on a park bench and suddenly notice a mysterious man walking towards them, possibly carrying a gun. Person A immediately assumes the worst - that they are in danger, the man is carrying a weapon that will be used to attack them, and that they must act alone to protect themselves, as the other two individuals on the bench could be dangerous as well. Person B acknowledges the possibility of danger, but believes that all three people must quickly cooperate in order to find a solution and avoid a dangerous situation. Person C sits on the bench philosophizing around the nature of the situation, contemplating the multiple reasons for which the man could be approaching them, wondering what ideas the two other people might have about the situation, and sitting in awe at the concept that the ideas Person A and B have represent reality and truth in their minds. Of the three people sitting on the bench, which two individuals are most alike?

These individuals can be interpreted to be analogous to the main theories of International Relations- realism, liberalism, and constructivism, in their respective order. We use theory, in order to simplify the complex interactions of our world, and with this theory we can make sense of the world around us. Thus, we can use the three main theories of IR to explain our surroundings, like the individuals aimed to explain the situation presented before them. Some theories, like individuals, resonate, or are more alike than others. In order to draw these ties, it is first important to understand the nature of each theory.

In its essence, realism holds an unyielding pessimistic view on the world, which claims that the behavior of states, whose primary purpose is self-preservation, revolves around increasing their power relative to other states and holds a zero-sum bargaining context. Liberalism, on the other hand, born in the 1970’s as a response to the morose nature of realism and looking beyond power politics as the ruling factor of the world, emphasizes how the international system has space for cooperation, the importance of domestic preferences and interdependence, the value of institutions and non-state actors, and holds a non-zero sum bargaining context. Constructivism then is a response to both theories and comes to claim that the world is the way it is because it has come to internalize certain understandings about how the international system operates, and highlights the importance of ideas, norms, intersubjectivity and social interaction in determining how the future unfolds. Between realism, liberalism and constructivism, the two latter ones are the most alike. This phenomenon can be seen through how the differing theories approach the concept of anarchy, their views on cooperation/conflict, who the main actors in the international order are, what driving forces they possess, and through a case study of the demise of the Cold War.

The concept of anarchy as understood in international relations implies that there is no overarching authority or power in the international system- no international 911, and each state holds sovereign power. The role anarchy plays in the international system varies amongst the major theories. For realists, regardless of the specific realist school, it implies the struggle for power, and that because of anarchy, states behavior is propelled to maximize security/power. For Kenneth Waltz, a major figure in neorealism, “because the system is anarchic (no central authority to protect states from one another), each state has to survive on its own... [which] would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with, more powerful rivals.” (Walt, 21) In offensive realism, a school of structural realism argued by John Mearsheimer, anarchy is one of five main assumptions, an “ordering principle”, that explains “why great powers vie with each other for power and strive for hegemony [control of one state over others]”. (Mearsheimer, 29) The security dilemma, “the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (Jervis, 169), plays a primary role and calls for survival as a primary goal. Regardless of specific realist theory, realists agree that anarchy creates an environment where states aren’t to be trusted, and the world is structured to be a self-help world because of it, thus relative power should be increased. Anarchy plays a crucial role in the understanding of realism and distinguishes the theory from liberalism and constructivism, which are both similar in the sense that anarchy does not play an essential role. Liberalism acknowledges the existence of anarchy, but claims it can be overcome when states and institutions cooperate to gain benefits and set up norms in the aims of absolute power, rather than relative power. It “explains policy as a function of the societal context, and focuses on how domestic conflict, not international anarchy, imposes suboptimal outcomes.” (Moravcsik, 537) For liberalists, anarchy isn’t strictly conducive to lack of security as realists state, as cooperative behavior can quickly override this possibility. Constructivism shares the perspective that anarchy isn’t strictly conducive to lack of security, and takes it a step further by claiming that it isn’t strictly conducive to any particular behavior per se; that it has no behavioral repercussions other than those defined by actors. Alexander Wendt, the author of “Anarchy is What States Make of It”, argues, as his title states, that it is not anarchy itself that drives behavior, but the meanings that states attach to it, which can lead to either conflict or cooperation. He argues that “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure.”(Wendt, 394) Both constructivism and liberalism, with their focus on the possibility of cooperation (versus realism’s view that cooperation can only exist in a matter of self interest) can move beyond the security dilemma, security as a main propeller, and great power politics.

 One could claim that realism and liberalism are the most similar because they both acknowledge that anarchy does, in fact, play a role in the international system, while constructivism doesn’t assert that it necessarily does. Nevertheless, this claim is refuted once it is acknowledged that both constructivism and realism reject the concept that anarchy is a driving force for how states act, both emphasizing how it is not a propeller, and behavior can be adjusted around it.

Another main point that draws similarities between constructivism and liberalism, and distinguishes realism from these theories are the main actors in the theories. The major actors in realist theory are states, more specifically states that act “rationally”, meaning that “they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival.” (Mearsheimer, 31) Realism dismisses the role of institutions, IGO’s, NGO’s, and individuals, which play a role as key actors in liberalism, to overcome barriers to cooperation, and in constructivism, to foment the spread of ideas and norms. Realism also directly opposes both theories by viewing states as “black boxes” or “billiard balls” in the sense that they are driven by the same pursuits, while at the core of their theory, liberalism and constructivism acknowledge the importance that states have different pursuits and preferences. In liberal theory lies the understanding “that the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state behavior by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences.” (Moravcsik, 516) One could aim to point out that realism and liberalism are the most similar in views of rationality. Risk-aversion is one of three core assumptions in liberal theory, and one of five in realism, yet this can be counter argued with the claim that liberalism only assumes this on a general level but distinguished itself by accepting how “some individuals in any given society may be risk-acceptant or irrational” (Moravcsik, 517) versus realism that takes it as fact that states always act rationally. By making this qualification, liberalism most closely associates with constructivism in the way that ideas are a driving force in how actors behave.

The similarities between liberalism and constructivism and the divergence of realism, attached to a real world example, can be seen in how the theories attempt to explain the end of the Cold War. Realism has a difficult time illustrating why the Soviet Union would retreat from pursuing hegemonic status as well as the unipolarity (one state holding the most power) that arose from the end of the war. Furthermore, it does not explain how there is still cooperation since this doesn’t comply with the idea of power maximization of states. As explained by liberalist John Ikenberry, for realists “one of the most puzzling aspects of world order after the Cold War is the persistence of stable and cooperative relations among the advanced industrial democracies, despite the collapse of bipolarity and dramatic shifts in the distribution of power.” (Ikenberry, 43) Liberalists and constructivist ideals of the importance of institutions and ideas then come to explain these occurrences. Ikenberry claims that “it was the exercise of strategic restraint-made good by an open polity and binding institutions-more than the direct and instrumental exercise of hegemonic domination that ensured a cooperative and stable postwar order.” (Ikenberry, 44) The liberalist explanation for world order can be explained with constructivism, making the theories gravitate towards each other, but clashes directly with realism. Constructivism claims that dynamics between states are a certain way because the actors have internalized them, which supports the liberal logic of cooperative order between states Post-World War II despite power asymmetries. Strategic restraint in this allows for weaker states to acknowledge how the hegemon will not dominate them, which strays greatly from realist theory as it doesn’t follow the premise of uncertainty of intentions and the security dilemma. Here, “the hegemonic state obtains commitments from secondary states to participate within the postwar order, and in return the hegemon places limits on the exercise of its power”, and the weaker states do not have the incentive to balance power against them, as realism would claim. (Ikenberry, 45) Constructivism is built around the importance of norms between actors to explain behavior, and accordingly liberal theory to explain this world order relies on the “potential binding effects of international institutions”, the “limits” (norms) implied among interactions, and transparency (a driving idea), which have all provided “mechanisms to increase confidence that the participating states would remain within the order and operate according to its rules and institutions”. (Ikenberry, 46) Again, these overlapping ideas between constructivism and liberalism clash with realism in the most basic sense- liberalism doesn’t even consider institutions as a main actor to the interaction states have.

Of the main IR theories, liberalism and constructivism are the most alike, while realism differs the most. This occurrence can be seen in how the latter treats anarchy as fundamental in explaining how states interact, while the other theories dismiss the idea of it being a dictating premise of the interactions, the differing views on cooperation, the main actors in each theory, and the resonating views of constructivism and liberalism, contrary to those of realism, to explain the end of the Cold War. 

Works Cited

Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992)

G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American PostwarOrder," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99)

Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30 (2)

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization

Morgenthau, Hans. “A Realist Theory of International Politics,” Politics among Nations, 3rd ed. (1960)

Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110 (Spring 1998)